Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 15 | Issue 2

Article 7

3-1-2001

Which of the Preparatory Commission's Latest
Proposals for the Definition of the Crime of
Aggression and the Exercise of Jurisdiction Should
Be Adopted into the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court?
Rachel Peirce

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the
Jurisdiction Commons
Recommended Citation
Rachel Peirce, Which of the Preparatory Commission's Latest Proposals for the Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the Exercise of
Jurisdiction Should Be Adopted into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 281 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol15/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Which of the Preparatory Commission's Latest Proposals
for the Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the
Exercise of Jurisdiction Should Be Adopted into the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?*
I. INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 1998, the final draft of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1 at the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court (Rome Conference) was completed. The Rome Statute
established the existence of an International Criminal Court (ICC), 2 "a
permanent institution" that has "the power to exercise its jurisdiction
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern .... " 3
Crimes that fall within the ICC's jurisdiction include genocide, 4
crimes against humanity, 5 war crimes, 6 and the crime of aggression. 7
These crimes are included because they are the "most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole." 8 Except for the
crime of aggression, the elements of each admissible crime are defined in
the Rome Statute. 9 Apparently, because no consensus for a definition of
the crime of aggression could be agreed upon at a time near the desired
completion of the final draft, a qualification was set forth in Article 5(2)
of the Rome Statute stating that the ICC could "exercise" its jurisdiction
over the crime of aggression once a provision was enacted which "de-

*

Copyright© 2001 by Rachel Peirce.
I. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF.l83/9
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. See Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression? 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L
& COMP. L. 413 (2000) (citations omitted).
3. /d. Rome Statute, supra note I, art. I.
4. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 5(1)(a).
5. See id. art. 5(1 )(b).
6. See id. art. 5(1)(c).
7. See id. art. 5(1)(d).
8. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 5(1 ).
9. Articles 6, 7, and 8 contain definitions of the terms genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes, respectively. See id. art. 6-8.
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fin[ ed] the crime and set[] conditions" of jurisdiction "with respect to
this crime." 10 During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the U.S. strongly
opposed the inclusion of the crime of aggression because "[t]his issue
11
alone could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility."
This comment briefly describes some of the provisions of the Rome
Statute that the U.S. opposes along with its reasoning. As demonstrated
above, the crime of aggression is one of the United States' primary reasons for not signing the Rome Statute. 12 A brief history surrounding this
crime and an analysis of the latest three proposals set forth by the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (Preparatory
Commission) for the definition of aggression and its jurisdiction will be
discussed. In addition, the question of whether the crime of aggression
should be excluded altogether will be addressed. Finally, this comment
will conclude with a discussion about issues surrounding the definition of
aggression and its jurisdiction, along with the ratification of the Rome
Statute as a whole.

II. UNITED STATES' CONCERNS WITH THE ROME STATUTE
A. Article 12: Personal Jurisdiction

The United States strongly opposes the far-reaching jurisdiction of
the ICC over individuals. Currently, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction
over an accused individual if the alleged perpetrator is a member of a
state party or if the alleged crime occurred in the territory of a state
party .13 Due to this provision, any state that has ratified the Rome Statute
may refer an admissible crime to a prosecutor of the ICC regardless of
whether the accused individual is a member of a state that ratified the
Rome Statute. 14 Thus, not only does the "treaty expose[] nonparties in
ways that parties are not exposed," 15 but the Rome Statme also contradicts customary international law which provides that only parties to a
treaty are bound to its provisions. 16 Furthermore, due to the broad jurisdiction of Article 12, an incentive exists for states to more willingly abstain from intervention in those "lawful, but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and
I 0. /d. art. 5(2).
II. David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The United States and
the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 12, 21 (Jan. 1999).
12. See generally id.
13. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 12(1)(a).
14. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 18.

15. /d.
16. See id.
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world peace so desperately seek from the United States and other military powers." 17
B. Article 13: Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Article 13, a state party 18 or the Security Council, pursuant to
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 19 may refer to an independent
prosecutor of the ICC cases in which it appears that admissible crimes
have occurred. 20 In addition, a prosecutor may self-initiate and investigate the possible occurrence of a crime. 21 One problem inherent in allowing either a prosecutor of the ICC to investigate crimes or a state party to
refer crimes is that such accusations may be politically motivated against
certain states, including the United States. 22 Because of its widespread
military involvement in the last century, the United States is an easy target for those opposed to its foreign policy. Thus, although the Rome
Statute has set forth provisions to eliminate this concem, 23 these procedural safeguards24 are ambiguous and do not provide adequate protection
for the United States.
C. Complementary Regime

During the course of negotiations, the United States stressed the importance of state sovereignty and the need for the ICC to not impinge
upon this right. 25 A protective device is set forth in Article 17, which
prohibits the ICC from proceeding with any case within the jurisdiction
of an implicated state unless the state is incapable or unwilling to determine if prosecution is necessary. 26 In addition, Article 18 imposes further
restrictions on the ICC's authority to go beyond a state's ability to prosecute.27 However, even with these restrictions, the possibility of the ICC
usurping power from states remains. The larger the territory and the
greater the number of individuals over which a court may exercise juris-

17. /d. at 19.
18. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 13(a).
19. See id. art. 13(b).
20. See id. art. 13.
21. See id. art. 13(c).
22. See infra text accompanying note 151.
23. See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal
Court, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT, (Aug. 1998) < ltttp:l/wo,nv.asil.orglinsigh23.htm>.
24. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 18 (explaining that before a prosecutor can investigate, his or her complaint must be approved by three-judge pre-trial chamber, which approval may
be subject to an interlocutory appeal to an appeals chamber).
25. See generally Scharf, supra note 23.
26. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 17.
27. See id. art. 18.
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diction, the greater the power and potential for abuse. Thus, when creating an international court, state sovereignty must remain clearly intact.
State sovereignty is a vital protection to people and their representation
and its ideals need to be more strictly safeguarded than currently provided for in the Rome Statute.

D. Amendment Provisions
Articles 121 and 123 set forth the provisions for adding or revising
28
the text of the Rome Statute seven years after its enforcement date. Article 121 provides that a two-thirds majority of state parties is required to
29
approve such an amendment. Once ratified by seven-eighths of the
State Parties, the enforcement of an amendment may begin one year
later. 30
One United States concern with these amendment provisions is that
in the future, more "serious" crimes could be added to the statute that the
United States may oppose. 31 Of even greater concern is the fact that if a
state party does not accept an amendment relating to a new or revised
crime, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction when "committed by that
State Party's nationals or on its territory." 32 Thus, although a state party
can opt out of new or revised crimes amended into the Rome Statute, a
33
nonparty state can be subject to such crimes via Article 12. These provisions also violate customary international law because state parties that
have signed the treaty become immune to jurisdiction of new or revised
crimes while its provisions bind nonparties.

E. Manner of Finalization
The United States delegation proposed many changes to the draft of
the Rome Statute during the Rome Conference. Many of the proposed
changes were not made or even addressed. In addition, on the final day
of the conference, a small number of delegates (not including any U.S.
delegates) met behind closed doors, making final changes to the Rome
34
Statute and finishing at two o'clock in the morning. Some of the text of
the draft statute was changed, including portions previously approved by
the Committee of the Whole. 35 Thus, fearing that numerous issues had
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. art. 121(1).
See id. art. 121(3).
See id. art. 121(4).
See Scheffer, supra note II, at 18.
Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 121(5).
See Scheffer, supra note II, at 20.
See id.
See id.
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not been sufficiently scrutinized, the United States was concerned with
the '"take it or leave it' text for a permanent institution of law [that] was
not subjected to the rigorous review of the Drafting Committee or the
Committee of the Whole and was rushed to adoption hours later on the
evening of July 17 without debate." 36 In other words, "[s]o many issues
of fundamental importance remained open in April 1998 that [David
Scheffer and U.S. delegates] could only approach Rome with 'cautious
. .
"' 17
optimism.
III. PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference determined
that the Preparatory Commission, among other tasks, would be responsible for drafting a proposed provision for the crime of aggression? 8 Once
60 members have ratified the Rome Statute, the International Criminal
Court becomes effective. 39 Once this occurs, proposals regarding the
crime of aggression must be completed by the end of the first meeting of
the Assembly of State Parties. 40 The Preparatory Collltllission's latest
proposals for a definition and jurisdiction pertaining to the crime of aggression were released on July 6, 2000. 41
IV. HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

A. Background
Throughout history, the question of whether one group of individuals
has a moral right to commit an act of aggression against another group
has existed. 42 With the onset of the industrial revolution, the world became smaller as technology increased, increasing the need to answer this
43
question. In 1899, the First Hague Convention responded by attempting
36. /d.
37. /d. at 14.
38. See First Session of the Preparatory Commission (February /6-26, 1999), lNT'L CRIM.
CT. MONITOR (visited Sept. 12, 2000) <http://www.iccnow.org/html/monitor.htm> (section entitled
"Introduction").
39. See Carl M. Nesser, First Session of the Preparatory Commission (February /6-26,
1999), INT'LCRIM. CT. MONITOR (visited Sept. 12, 2000)
<http://www.iccnow.org/html/monitor.htm> (section entitled "Aggression").
40. See id.
41. See U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 5th Sess., at I,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.3/Rev.l (2000) [hereinafter Proposed Statute].
42. See Linda Jane Springrose, Aggression as a Core Crime in the Rome Statute Establishing
an International Criminal Court, 1999 ST. LoUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 151, 153 (citing I
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 167-174 (1986)).
43. See id. (citing I BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE
SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 4 (1975)).
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to curb aggression between states. 44 Although not specific in the procedures to be employed, this treaty provided not only for states to try to coexist peaceably with one another, but also encouraged settlements of disputes through the process of either mediation or arbitration before a Permanent Court of Arbitration. 45 Such provisions became more detailed in
1910 during the Second Hague Convention. However, because the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration was compulsory, many
countries did not submit disputes to it. 46 Although the League of Nations,
which outlawed war, was formed in part to prevent states from incurring
the type of destruction imposed upon many nations in World War I, it did
not prevent the occurrence of World War II. 47
B. Nuremberg

A new approach was implemented at Nuremberg. Instead of imposing a Versailles-type treaty on all of Germany collectively (as was done
after World War I), military leaders responsible for the atrocities of
World War II were tried individually. 48 The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg was the governing document
used, providing for crimes against peace (aggression), crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. 49 In addition, the Charter stated that those individuals tried could not claim as a defense that they were only following
superior orders. 50 The German defense of nullum poena sine lege was
raised along with the criticism that the crime of aggression was an ex
post facto law. 51 The IMT rejected these notions by citing the precedence
of past laws and other historic attempts to curb aggression. 52 In addition,
the IMT distinguished the crime of aggression from other crimes by stating, "[T]o initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of
the whole." 53 The Tokyo War Crime Tribunal in the Far East tried Japa-

44. See id. at 154.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 155.
48. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 155.
49. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 1945 U.S.T. I, 7-8 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
50. See id. at 8-9.
51. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 156-57.
52. See id. at 157.
53. /d. (quoting Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where
they Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375,452 (1992)).
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nese leaders for the same crimes as in Nuremberg with similar provisions
pertaining to the crime of aggression. 54
C. The United Nations and the Security Council

In 1945, the United Nations Charter was signed, 55 and in 1951 the
first United Nation's draft regarding the creation of a permanent international criminal court was written. 56 However, instead of trying persons
on an individual basis, the U.N. Charter and subsequent U.N. resolutions
advanced the notion that aggression involves acts of a state entity. 57
Certain U.N. provisions outline the use of force and aggression along
with the proper role of the Security Council in regulating such force. Article 33 of the U.N. Charter provides that
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice. 58
In addition, the U.N. Charter allows the Security Council, in its
judgment, to attempt to persuade parties in a dispute to resolve such matters by the same means. 59 If the Security Council determines that a threat
to peace exists, it may, at its discretion, take action 60 and encourage the
61
states involved in the dispute to remedy the situation through the use of
sanctions or by the imposition of other methods of non-force. 62 To use
force, the Security Council must first determine that such force is essential to maintain or restore peace. 63 Once this requirement is met, the Security Council may use force as a source of compliance if an aggressive
state will not settle the dispute through peaceful means 64 and if peaceful
means cannot adequately remedy the situation. 65
In the case of an armed attack by a state, the U.N. Charter allows the
attacked state to defend itself. However, the attacked state must cease its
54. /d.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 159.
See id. at 158.
See Springrose, supra note 42, at 15.
/d. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 33).
See id.
See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 39).
See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 40).
See id.
See Springrose, supra note 42, at 15 (citing U.N.
See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 41).
See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 42).

CHARTER

art. 42).
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defense once the Security Council intervenes and determines a course of
action to be taken regarding the matter. 66 Thereafter, the Security Council may intervene67 at its own discretion. 68
Although the above United Nations provisions furnish guidelines regarding the use of force, the definition of what constitutes an "act of aggression" was not determined until the General Assembly passed Resolution 3314 in 1974.69 The definition includes "the use of armed forces by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the U.N., as set out in this definition." 70 The resolution details specific events that qualify as an act of aggression. 71 In addition, this
resolution only applies to acts of aggression committed by states. 72 However, because the definition of an act of aggression was set forth in a
resolution, the definition is not binding on its face on the member states
73
of the United Nations.
D. Drafting the Statute for the ICC

Starting in 1992, the International Law Commission (ILC) explored
the question of whether a permanent international court could actually
74
exist. Because the United States would sign a draft statute of the treaty
if the provisions were sufficiently aligned with United States priorities,
United States personnel followed the work of the ILC closely during
1993. 75 Chief among the United States' priorities included specifying
definitions of war crimes and excluding the crime of aggression. 76 During 1997, the United States advocated that the crime of aggression should
not be included unless the Rome Statute could "define and qualify its inclusion properly." 77 Although the United States advocated the position
that the Security Council should refer all cases brought before the ICC,

66. See id. at 159-60 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 51).
67. See id. at 159-60 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 51).
68. See id. at 160 (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42).
69. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 160 (citation omitted).
70. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 392, U.N. Doc. N9890 (1974)
(reprinted in Springrose, supra note 42, at 160).
71. See id. art. 3.
72. See Springrose, supra note 43, at 160.
73. See id.
7 4. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 12.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 12-13.
77. !d. at 13.
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rather than through the initiation of a state prosecutor, the U.S. did not
receive enough support to sustain this position in the Rome Statute.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION'S THREE
PROPOSALS FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

The Commission's latest proposals for a statement of jurisdiction and
79
a definition of the crime of aggression were released on July 6, 2000.
The document consolidates various proposals for the crime of aggression. 80 The following will discuss the two proposed options along with
their variations. The history necessary to comprehensively understand
the significance of each proposal along with the respective strengths and
weaknesses of each option will also be provided.
Two basic assumptions are made with respect to all of the options
81
proposed, which, for the most part, have received widespread support.
The first is "the principle under which the crime of aggression is committed by political or military leaders of a State." 82 This assumption precludes the trial of any terrorist regime, non-state party group, or individual of a state that acts contrary to the beliefs or purported views of the
state itself where no possibility of trial exists before the ICC can act as a
83
deterrent. Underlying this principle is the idea that a state is its own
sovereign and thus has the power to discipline and deal justly with its
own citizens.
The second assumption is "the principle that planning, preparation or
ordering of aggression should be criminalized only when an act of aggression takes place." 84 Over the years, proponents have argued that by
criminalizing aggression, many states will be prevented and deterred
from committing such an act. However, under this assumption a person
cannot be tried in the ICC for devising or scheming to commit a crime
unless the planned act actually takes place.

78. See id. at 15.
79. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 8-9.
80. See id. at II.
81. See id.
82. !d.
83. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 444.
84. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II.
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A. Option 1
1. Text common to all three variations
Option 1 is comprised of a starting paragraph that branches into three
variations. The text common to all three variations relies on the first as85
sumption given above as it states, "the crime of aggression means ...
any of the following acts committed by [an individua1] 86 who is in the
position of exercising control or capable of directing the political or military action of a state ...." 87
In addition, whether the Security Council will determine if the crime
of aggression has been committed depends on the formula that is
88
amended into the Rome Statute. The United States wants the Security
Council to be the entity that determines whether an act of aggression has
been committed. One obvious reason includes the fact that the U.S. is a
permanent member of the Security Council, and thus could veto any trial
for the crime of aggression it deems unworthy of prosecution. Therefore,
the United States' concern over whether its military or political leaders
would be subject to trial in the ICC for the crime of aggression would
cease to exist.

2. Variation 1
Variation 1 of this option completes the definition by describing
what the person in control must exactly initiate or carry out in order to
89
qualify for committing a crime of aggression. The result of Variation 1
is an overly-broad definition that fails to specify exactly what a person
must do to be tried before the ICC. 90

85. See supra text accompanying note 89.
86. The brackets contained around words in the options for the crime of aggression demonstrate "different formulas than were suggested." Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12.
87. /d. at 8.
88. See id.
89. Full textofVariation 1:
[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression] [a war of aggression, or a
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing) against another State [against another State, or depriving other people of their rights to selfdetermination], in [manifest] contravention of the Charter of the U.N., to violate [to
threaten or to violate] the [sovereignty,] territorial integrity or political independence of
that State [or the inalienable rights of those people] [except when this is required by the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and individual or collective
rights of self-defense].
/d. at 8.
90. See id. at II.
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3. Variation 2
Unlike Variation I of Option 1, Variation 2 specifies that the act of
aggression must be "an armed attack directed by a State" and initiated or
carried out "with the object or result of establishing a military occupation
of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof." 91 Under
this variation, the definition of the crime of aggression is narrowed as the
aim of the aggressor state must be to annex or occupy part of another
92
state's territory. Thus, this variation of the crime of aggression may be
an attempt to narrow the scope of the definition to encourage agreement.

4. Variation 3
Variation 3 of Option 1 includes the general definition-based paragraph of Variation I and adds to it a paragraph that provides a specific
list of acts which, when initiated or carried out by a control person, can
be characterized as the crime of aggression. 93 The listing of these specific
acts originate from General Assembly Resolution 3314, passed on December 14, 1974. 94 These acts provide concrete guidance by demonstrating what events may qualify persons to be tried for the crime of aggression. Among the listed acts listed are "[t]he invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of a territory of another State," 95 and the "bombardment"96 or "blockade ... of a State by the armed forces of another
State ... :m
Grant M. Dawson discusses why Resolution 3314 could be used to
help define the crime of aggression in his article Defining Substantive
Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court: What is the Crime of Aggression?98 One reason he gives
99
is that although the ICC tries individuals, the act of an individual
should not be disconnected from the act of a state. 100 The first assumption given above with respect to the options listed is that those persons
tried must be political or military leaders of a state. 101 As described

91. /d.at8.
92. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II.
93. See id. at 9.
94. See id. at II.
95. /d.
96. /d.
97. /d.
98. See generally Dawson, supra note 2.
99. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. I.
I 00. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 435.
101. See supra note 82.
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102

above, Resolution 3314 was enacted to provide guidelines for the Security Council in determining when a state had committed an act of aggression. Thus, by adopting Option 1, Variation 3, the specific acts derived from Resolution 3314 can "be a guide for when the individuals in
charge of a state's actions have committed the acts required for a finding
of aggression." 103
Another reason for adopting the provisions set forth in Resolution
3314 is the added uniformity created by the use of familiar legal language in the Resolution. For example, in the Resolution's definition of
104
what constitutes prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, the spe105
cific acts listed are similar to those found in a standard penal code.
Thus, although the acts listed originate from a non-binding General Assembly resolution, the language of the Resolution adds certainty and uniformity to an inherently vague and hard-to-define crime.
B. Option 2
Option 2 states, "For the purposes of the present Statute and subject
to a prior determination by the U.N. Security Council of an act of aggression by the State concerned, the crime of aggression means any of the
following acts: planning, preparing, initiating or carrying out a war of
106
aggression." Under this alternative and as discussed later, the Security
Council determines whether an act of aggression by a state has occurred.
The Security Council applies this determination to a definition of aggression derived from Article 6(a) of the Charter of the IMT of Nuremberg.107 Thus, this alternative integrates both the role of the Security
Council along with the definition used in the Nuremberg trial.
A problem inherent in Option 2 is its vague definition of what acts
constitute aggression-a definition taken nearly word for word from Article 6(a) of the Charter of Nuremberg. What constitutes "planning, preparing, initiating, or carrying out a war of aggression" 108 is subject to
various interpretations. If only the above definition is used in determining whether a crime of aggression has occurred, then certain individuals
may be dismissed while others who committed the same action are tried

I 02. See supra note 69.
103. Dawson, supra note 2, at 435.
104. See id. at 435-36; see also G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 70, art. 2.
105. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 436 (referring to G.A. Res. 3314, arts. I & 3).
I 06. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 9.
I 07. See id. at II. Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter states that crimes against peace include the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of participation in a common
plan .... "Nuremberg Charter, supra note 49, at 7.
108. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 9.
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before the ICC for purely political (or other) reasons. On the other hand,
the Security Council may provide a check on the potential lack of uniformity as it must determine whether an act of aggression has occurred
before an individual can be tried before the ICC. 109 In addition, by assuming that an act must actually have been committed before an individual may be prosecuted before the ICC for committing the crime of aggression, 110 much of the uncertainty and the potential for lack of
uniformity under this definition is diminished.

C. Alternative 3: To Not Define Aggression
Even while reviewing and being involved with the draft statutes, the
United States opposed the inclusion of a qualitative definition of the
crime of aggression. 111 The crime is hard to define and to categorize. In
addition, the argument can be made that, pursuant to Chapter VII, the
Security Council can punish states for aggression and the leaders of those
states can be tried for other war crimes already defined in the Rome Statute.112 Thus, due to overlap, the crimes already defined in the Rome Statute negate the need to define the crime of aggression. 113 However, including aggression as a crime encapsulates the history of international
114
disapproval of waging aggressive war. In fact, the IMT intentionally
included and distinguished aggression from other crimes at Nuremberg.115 This viewpoint asserts that by excluding the crime of aggression,
the Rome Statute will not "take into account the value of the criminaliza116
tion of the aggression itself."
Another argument for the inclusion of the crime of aggression advocates that "[a]ggressive war itself can lead to other core crimes, thus the
initial prevention of war could accelerate compliance with other interna117
tional law."
However, the current proposals for a definition of the
crime of aggression will not accelerate compliance because the assumption made by all the proposed options is that the act must be committed
118
before one can be tried for the crime.

109. See id. at 9.
II 0. See supra note 82.
Ill. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 12-13.
112. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 446.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See supra note 53.
116. Dawson, supra note 2, at 446.
117. !d. at 447.
118. See supra note 82.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION'S THREE PROPOSALS
FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION

The report issued with respect to the Preparatory Commission's latest proceedings at the Fifth Session attempts to consolidate into three options the views pertaining to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction for the crime of aggression. 119 All of the proposals attempt to
address the authority of the Security Council to determine that an act of
aggression of a state has occurred within the jurisdiction of the ICC by
an individual purported to have committed the crime of aggression. In all
three options, before the ICC may proceed against an individual, the Security Council must first have the discretion to determine whether the related state has committed an act of aggression.
A. Option 1
1. Text common to the two variations
Option 1 states that the Security Council shall determine whether an
act of aggression has been committed according to the rules of the U.N.
Charter before any proceedings take place in the ICC. 120 It also states that
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is governed by Article 13 of the
Rome Statute. 121 Under Article 13, the Security Council, pursuant to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may refer certain situations to the ICC
in which it appears that admissible crimes have occurred. 122 Similarly, a
state party may refer matters to the ICC in which admissible crimes have
been violated under Article 14. 123 Furthermore, a prosecutor may take the
initiative and investigate whether crimes have been committed. 124 However, after either receiving a referral from a state party or after an investigation has been initiated by an independent prosecutor, the ICC may
not proceed under this option until the Security Council "first make[s] a
decision establishing that an act of aggression has been committed by the
State whose national is concemed." 125 Thus, the difference between jurisdiction over other admissible crimes of the ICC and the crime of aggression is that, under all three options, the Security Council must first
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 10.
See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 13(b).
See id. art. 13(a).
See id. art. 13(c).
Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at I 0.
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determine that an act of aggression by a state has been committed before
the ICC may proceed. 126 Once a complaint regarding the crime of aggression has been received, the Security Council has either six or twelve
127
months to determine whether the alleged act occurred.
The underlying assumption of Option 1 is the "attempt to reflect
views seeking to reconcile the prerogatives of the Security Council with
the independence of the Court." 128 In addition, Article 5(2) of the Rome
Statute states that jurisdiction over the crime of aggression shall be exer129
cised in harmony with relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter. Thus,
although the ICC "exercises its jurisdiction over persons on the crime of
aggression," 130 the Security Council must first establish "the existence of
an act of aggression." 131 The reasoning includes that under Article 39 of
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is the entity responsible "for establishing the existence of an act of aggression." 132 Therefore, under this
option, the Security Council should first determine that an act of aggression by the state has occurred before permitting a trial by the ICC for the
cnme o f aggressiOn. 133
0

0

2. Variation 1
Variation 1 simply adds that if the Security Council does not determine whether an act of aggression was committed within the time-frame
allotted, the ICC may prosecute without the Security Council's approval.134 Also included in this variation is the assurance that, once decided, the Security Council's determination of whether an act of aggression has occurred is totally separate and independent of the ICC's
135
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.

3. Variation 2
If the Security Council does not make a decision within the allotted
time-frame, Variation 2 of Option 1 allows the ICC to request that the
General Assembly, under Articles 12, 14, and 24 of the U.N. Charter, de126. See id. at I 0.
127. See id.
128. !d. at 12. As discussed above, relevant articles in the U.N. Charter and General Assembly Resolution 3314 provide a framework for the Security Council to determine when an act of aggression has occurred.
129. See id. at 12; see also Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 5(2).
130. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12 (emphasis added).
131. !d. (emphasis added).
132. !d. (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. See id. at I 0.
135. See id.
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termine whether an act of aggression has occurred. 136 If the General Assembly does not make any recommendation within the proposed twelvemonth allotment, the ICC may then proceed without any consent. 137 This
variation goes one step further than Variation 1 by providing that the ICC
may proceed only after both the Security Council and General Assembly
have failed to make a decision concerning the occurrence of an act of aggression. However, such a decision becomes susceptible to political maneuvering because the General Assembly is composed of delegates from
the government of each member state of the U.N. and decisions are determined by majority vote with each delegate casting one vote. Thus,
whether one favors this variation depends upon one's political views on
the subject of representation by a majority vote and whether or not one
believes that the current majority view in the General Assembly is agreeable to the state with which one is affiliated.

B. Option 2
The provisions of this option provide that the Security Council will
determine whether a state committed an act of aggression in relation to
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. 138 Article 39 states that the Security
Council, at its discretion, may take action when peace among parties
ceases to exist. 139 If not already determined by the Security Council, the
ICC will request that the Security Council decide whether the state related to the crime of aggression in question has committed the act when a
complaint of that crime is brought before it. 140 If the Security Council has
not made a determination within twelve months after the ICC's request
and has not renewed the request under Article 16 of the Rome Statute,
the ICC may then proceed and exercise jurisdiction over the person. 141
Thus, this option is similar to Option 1, Variation 1 in the sense that
both basically provide for a prior Security Council determination if certain time constraints are met.
C. Option 3

This option is the same as the second option listed under the proposals for the definition of the crime of aggression 142 in that under both, the
definition and the exercise of jurisdiction are intertwined and co-exist in
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at I 0 & 12.
id. at 12.
id. at II.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II.
id. at 12.
supra text accompanying note 106.
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144
this option. 143 The Nuremberg definition for the crime of aggression is
adopted "subject to a prior determination by the U.N. Security Council of
145
an act of aggression by the State concerned." As with the other two options, the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is subject
to a prior determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression
by the related state has occurred. However, under this option, no provisions are made which indicate whether the ICC may proceed if the Security Council fails to determine that an act of aggression by a state has occurred. Thus, the ambiguity surrounding this option could potentially
lead to a misuse of power.
The idea underlying all of the Preparatory Commission's proposals is
that the Security Council should make a prior determination that an act of
aggression by a state has occurred before the ICC may proceed. By doing
this, the ICC recognizes the function of the Security Council regarding
the use of force and reconciles the state concept underlying the crime of
aggression by which an individual may be charged.

D. Alternative 4: No Security Council Determination
Although not proposed in the Preparatory Commission's report at the
Fifth Session, many have argued that the Security Council need not determine whether the state concerned has committed an act of aggression
with respect to a person tried before the ICC. Historical precedent for
such an argument arises from the successful Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.146 In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the
U.S. had committed an act of aggression against Nicaragua in 1986
147
without any determination of state aggression by the Security Counci1.
Furthermore, because it is not deemed an international agreement, General Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines an act of aggression, is
148
not binding law . Thus, under this proposal, the crime of aggression
would be subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as other admissible crimes under the Rome Statute.
Those in favor of this alternative could also argue that a prior Security Council determination would shift the exercise of jurisdiction over
this crime from an independent and neutral court (the ICC) to a political
body (the Security Council or, perhaps, the General Assembly). However, due to the uncertainty regarding provisions pertinent to an inde143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II n.2.
See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 49, at 4.
Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II.
See Springrose, supra note 42, at 167.
See id.
See id. at 166.
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pendent state prosecutor, the ICC has the potential to become a political
entity itself. 149 Thus, if a prior determination must be made by the Security Council before a state party may refer a matter to the ICC or an independent prosecutor may itself investigate a potential claim, an added
check is provided to help prevent the ICC from becoming political and
corrupt.
Another concern raised by requiring a prior Security Council determination is that, due to the veto power of the five permanent members of
the Security Council, 150 any permanent member could preclude an "accused" person from adverse ICC action. This result seems likely, as the
Security Council has rarely functioned efficiently or effectively in the
past due to the diverse economic and political views of the five permanent members. 151 Thus, although the Security Council has been instrumental in determining whether an act of aggression has occurred in the
past, many arguments have been made against such a future ICC determination.
VI. CONCLUSION

Although many states disapprove of aggression, history has demonstrated that agreement upon what constitutes aggression is very difficult.
Currently, Option 1, Variation 3 of the Preparatory Commission's proposal provides the most guidance because it lists specific events that may
qualify and help codify the crime.
In addition, the latest proposals of the Preparatory Commission provide for a determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression
of a state has occurred before the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the
crime. By doing this, the ICC recognizes the function of the Security
Council regarding the use of force and links the state concept of aggression to the individual who may be tried before the ICC for that crime.

149. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
150. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (3d ed. 1999).
See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 23-32.
151. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 161 (citation omitted). For an example of stagnancy in
the Security Council during the Korean War once a permanent member disagreed with the stance
taken, see LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
WORLD POLITICS 150-53 (3d ed. 2000).
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Before the crime of aggression can ever be adopted into the Rome
Statute, the definition must not only be detailed and expressed in a manner that will enforce the idea that aggression is an inherent evil, it must
also prevent the definition from being subject to political erosion. If
amended into the Rome Statute, the crime statute's ability to perform its
function is highly doubtful due to the inherent ambiguities and uncertainty associated with both the definition of aggression and the Rome
Statute's provisions regarding jurisdiction and amendments.
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